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SYMPOSIUM 
TERRORIST INCITEMENT 
ON THE INTERNET 
FOREWORD 
Alexander Tsesis* 
 
The internet is an astoundingly robust and dynamic instrument for all 
manner of communications.  It is a platform for an array of webpages, blogs, 
chatrooms, virtual groups, news media, political forums, advertisement 
options, cybersleuth sites, revenge spaces, shaming discussion groups, 
incitement networks, and much more.  While many pages on the internet are 
devoted to civil discourse, others are dedicated to calumnious activities.  
Along with newspapers and university websites, there are others engaged in 
cybershaming1 and cyberbullying.2 
Of even greater social, political, and cultural consequence is the slew of 
websites committed to the spread of hate against various groups,3 and in its 
darkest crevasses are terrorist websites dedicated to inciting violence, 
recruiting like-minded individuals, and indoctrinating others on the use of 
political, religious, and otherwise ideological violence.4  Terrorist speech on 
the internet poses a threat worldwide.  The realm of communications has 
vastly expanded the delivery of constructive and destructive information.  
Groups who seek to alter governments’ policies and religious practices 
through havoc, violence, and intimidation are among those who exploit the 
cross-border nature of internet protocols and electromagnetic packets.  In 
 
*  Raymond & Mary Simon Chair in Constitutional Law and Professor of Law, Loyola 
University School of Law, Chicago.  This Foreword provides an overview the Fordham Law 
Review symposium entitled Terrorist Incitement on the Internet held at Fordham University 
School of Law. 
 
 1. See Patricia Sanchez Abril, A (My)space of One’s Own:  On Privacy and Online Social 
Networks, 6 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 73, 78–81 (2007) (discussing the limited capacity 
of tort law to provide remedies for internet posts aimed to shame a party but not rising to the 
falsity that must be proven for a viable slander or libel action). 
 2. See generally Alison Virginia King, Constitutionality of Cyberbullying Laws:  
Keeping the Online Playground Safe for Both Teens and Free Speech, 63 VAND. L. REV. 845 
(2010). 
 3. Alexander Tsesis, Hate in Cyberspace:  Regulating Hate Speech on the Internet, 38 
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 817, 818 (2001). 
 4. See Alexander Tsesis, Terrorist Communications on Social Media, 70 VAND. L. REV. 
651, 655 (2017). 
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addition to open propaganda on forums such as YouTube and Facebook, 
terrorists have increasingly exploited “darknets” to obfuscate and anonymize 
their activities through networks like Tor, I2P, and Freenet.5  While all of 
these are benign tools useful for confidential interactions, privacy, and other 
legitimate purposes, international criminals—terrorists, counterfeiters, drug 
dealers, and arms dealers among them—exploit these tools for nefarious 
purposes. 
I organized this symposium to advance understanding of how terrorist 
communications drive and influence social, political, religious, civil, literary, 
and artistic conduct.  Viewing terrorist speech through wide prisms of law, 
culture, and contemporary media can provide lawmakers, adjudicators, and 
administrators a better understanding of how to contain and prevent the 
exploitation of modern communication technologies to influence, recruit, and 
exploit others to perpetrate ideologically driven acts of violence.  
Undertaking such a multipronged study requires not only looking at the 
personal and sociological appeals that extreme ideology exerts but also 
considering how to create political, administrative, educational, and 
economic conditions to effect positive change at micro and macro levels.  The 
deep analysis that a symposium provides can paint a more comprehensive 
picture to explain the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of various memes, 
videos, interactive websites, group chat rooms, and blogs that justify, glorify, 
or incite violence.  Moreover, understanding the operation of terrorist groups 
on the internet can help to explain their organizational hierarchies. 
Terrorist organizations’ increasingly diverse use of digital devices vastly 
expands their reach beyond the scope of traditional modes of 
communication—conversations, pamphlets, or couriers.6  The challenge 
facing government agencies and thinktanks is how to formulate policies, 
statutes, standards, and regulations for digital platforms that are likely to 
safeguard the public, while maintaining the constitutional standards of 
protected speech and privacy. 
First Amendment values are essential for a functional democracy, personal 
development, and the spread of sciences.  However, they do not require an 
absolute prohibition against national security-based restrictions.7  The 
compelling need for regulations is particularly evident when dealing with 
incitements to violence that are aimed at achieving political and religious 
ends.8  Terrorism is not a spontaneous reaction to the existing order; to the 
 
 5. EUROPOL, INTERNET ORGANISED CRIME THREAT ASSESSMENT 47 (2016). 
 6. See Stephen I. Landman, Note, Funding Bin Laden’s Avatar:  A Proposal for the 
Regulation of Virtual Hawalas, 35 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 5159, 5163–65 (2009). 
 7. See Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 570 (1976) (asserting that the “Court 
has frequently denied that First Amendment rights are absolute”). 
 8. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 160, 164–65 (1963) (asserting that the 
government has power to act in the interest of national security because the Constitution “is 
not a suicide pact”). 
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contrary, it requires planning, training, organizing, coordinating, executing, 
and debriefing for which the internet has proved to be a reliable tool.9 
Among the most urgent issues confronting governments and citizens is the 
extent to which the state can justify censoring speech that explicitly or 
implicitly threatens others.  One of the most respected principles of U.S. 
constitutional law is that the First Amendment does not prevent the 
government from enforcing criminal laws against speech aimed at inciting or 
likely to lead to an imminent harm.10  A more complex issue is the extent to 
which federal and state entities can censor online indoctrination that 
influences and directs persons to engage in future terrorist operations. 
The internet differs in part from traditional communications because of the 
great distances that often exist between online speakers and their audiences.  
Rarely will a statement posted on the internet present an imminent threat of 
harm.  However, traditional spatial and temporal considerations of 
imminence are insufficient for policy-makers to address internet-based 
terrorist incitement.  Online speech likely will not present any clear or present 
danger—except in the rare circumstance in which the target of inciteful 
comments is immediately proximate to the speaker, as if, for instance, an 
inflammatory message was sent to someone in the immediate vicinity of the 
sender.11  Many terrorist threats, calls for recruitment, and virtual meetings 
are made from remote locations, often from countries other than the location 
of the audience.12  Even threats to life and physical well-being might be made 
to instigate others to take action at some ambiguously designated opportune 
time.13 
The architecture of the internet creates new opportunities for the 
dissemination of information and the formation of groups.  Joint efforts 
between groups with no former association often arise through digital 
contacts.  For example, before his shooting spree and murder of American 
soldiers at Fort Hood in Texas, Major Nidal Hassan interacted and received 
encouragement from a radical Islamic imam in Yemen.14  Separately, a wife-
 
 9. See generally Gabriel Hallevy, Incapacitating Terrorism Through Legal Fight—The 
Need to Redefine Inchoate Offenses Under the Liberal Concept of Criminal Law, ALA. C.R. 
& C.L.L. REV., 2012, at 87. 
 10. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam) (“[T]he 
constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or 
proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is 
directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce 
such action.”). 
 11. Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 320 (1951) (“When clear and present danger of 
riot, disorder, interference with traffic upon the public streets, or other immediate threat to 
public safety, peace, or order, appears, the power of the State to prevent or punish is obvious.” 
(quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 308 (1940))). 
 12. See MARC SAGEMAN, LEADERLESS JIHAD:  TERROR NETWORKS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST 
CENTURY 109–11 (2008). 
 13. See id. at 109–123 (relating how terrorists post on the internet to influence current and 
future recruits). 
 14. Lessons from Fort Hood:  Improving Our Ability to Connect the Dots:  Hearing Before 
the Subcomm. on Oversight, Investigations, & Mgmt. of the H. Comm. on Homeland Sec., 
112th Cong. 15–16 (2012) (statement of Douglas E. Winter, Deputy Chair, The William H. 
Webster Commission); WILLIAM H. WEBSTER COMM’N, FINAL REPORT OF THE WILLIAM H. 
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and-husband terrorist team—Tashfeen Malik and Syed Farook—pored over 
hours of terrorist videos on YouTube and read the Al Qaeda magazine 
Inspire.15  Likewise, the computer of one of the brothers who participated in 
the 2013 Boston Marathon bombing contained several terrorist pamphlets 
from abroad.16  These terrorists were able to connect with handlers and could 
obtain literature to an extent that would have been unfathomable to previous 
generations.  All this has become possible just twenty years after the internet 
first became a popular tool of communication.  Since the mid-1990s, 
communication tools have steadily developed and have been adopted by 
people with the best, or the worst, intentions.17 
Internet tools have made it easier to influence and radicalize persons who, 
in the past, would have found it difficult to connect with terror networks.18  
They are part of the most disturbing aspect of internet communications and 
provide forums to ideologically driven violent groups in Afghanistan, 
Chechnya, Indonesia, Iraq, Lebanon, Malaysia, the Palestinian territories, the 
Philippines, Turkey, and beyond to share information about building bombs, 
developing terrorist cells, and perpetrating attacks.19  Prior to its creation, 
recruiters had to rely on face-to-face contacts at religious services, outdoor 
gatherings, and private meetings.  Now, the internet has made it easier to 
connect and communicate with terror organizations, locate potential recruits, 
create and sustain ideological communities, and instigate violence.20  The 
internet’s ability to provide quicker access to more information and to expand 
outreach to audiences has been invaluable to terrorists.  While mainstream 
media such as radio, newspapers, and television stations are closed to terrorist 
organizations in western countries, terrorist organizations can rely on 
websites to dehumanize enemies and present themselves as innocent victims 
of powerful, colonial states.21 
 
WEBSTER COMMISSION ON THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, COUNTERTERRORISM 
INTELLIGENCE, AND THE EVENTS AT FORT HOOD, TEXAS, ON NOVEMBER 5, 2009, at 41, 50–51 
(2012). 
 15. Greg Miller, Al-Qaeda Figure Seen as Key Inspiration for San Bernardino Attacker, 
WASH. POST (Dec. 18, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/al-
qaeda-figure-seen-as-key-inspiration-for-san-bernardino-attacker/2015/12/18/f0e00d80-
a5a0-11e5-9c4e-be37f66848bb_story.html [https://perma.cc/B927-7HVY]; Scott Shane, 
Internet Firms Urged to Limit Work of Anwar al-Awlaki, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 18, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/19/us/politics/internet-firms-urged-to-limit-work-of-
anwar-al-awlaki.html [https://perma.cc/AY3M-8QXZ]. 
 16. Peter Bergen & David Sterman, The Man Who Inspired the Boston Bombings, CNN 
(Apr. 11, 2014, 10:16 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/04/11/opinion/bergen-boston-
bombing-awlaki-jihadists/ [https://perma.cc/YTU2-H85D]. 
 17. See Lawrence Lessig, The Death of Cyberspace, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 337, 337 
(2000). 
 18. HOMELAND SEC. INST., THE INTERNET AS A TERRORIST TOOL FOR RECRUITMENT & 
RADICALIZATION OF YOUTH 1 (2009). 
 19. GABRIEL WEIMANN, U.S. INST. FOR PEACE, WWW.TERROR.NET:  HOW MODERN 
TERRORISM USES THE INTERNET 9 (2004). 
 20. J.M. Berger, How Terrorists Recruit Online (and How to Stop It), BROOKINGS 
INSTITUTION (Nov. 9, 2015), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2015/11/09/how-
terrorists-recruit-online-and-how-to-stop-it/ [https://perma.cc/F38G-JZNH]. 
 21. WEIMANN, supra note 19, at 6. 
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The focus and function of this symposium was to assess the limits of 
legitimate regulations of terrorist communications spread on websites 
sponsored by terrorist groups, email servers, internet service providers, 
listservs, social platforms, and other means of cybercommunication.  These 
subjects create one of the most pressing constitutional dilemmas of our day 
because of the potential consequences of misregulation.  The dilemmas 
facing regulators are diverse and range from how to curb overbroad 
government regulations likely to violate the freedom of association to how to 
empower law enforcement to react commensurately with the evils of terrorist 
indoctrination and incitement. 
Participants of the symposium sought to identify the categorical rules and 
balances that must be established by legislators and reviewed by courts to 
create sustainable and legally viable balances between robust protections of 
speech and effective safeguards for national security.  In a series of panels, 
the authors brought their expertise to bear on the topic for elucidating.  They 
explored whether and how government agencies should maintain content-
neutral regulations across the internet while shutting down truly threatening 
or inciteful posts calling for the ideologically driven murder of civilians.22  
The Articles in this issue are the result of that symposium, which I organized 
with the help of editors of the Fordham Law Review. 
In the first article, Professor Alan Chen argues that courts should continue 
to apply the imminent threat of harm test established in Brandenburg v. 
Ohio23 to review regulations restricting terrorist speech.24  He cautions 
against skewing First Amendment doctrine in reaction to two distinct forms 
of exceptionalism.25  First, he expresses concern that, as has occurred in the 
past, the government may undermine speech protections in response to 
exaggerated national-security concerns.26  Second, he suggests that courts 
may similarly overreact to the possibility that changes in digital 
communication technologies may exacerbate those security concerns in ways 
that call for more robust state intervention.27  The nation should be 
particularly skeptical when the government proclaims the need to censor 
expression in the face of the convergence of national security and internet 
exceptionalism.28  Narrowing free speech doctrine in response to these 
contemporary developments, Professor Chen argues, may not only skew free 
speech doctrine but may also influence law enforcement agencies’ decisions 
to adopt invasive surveillance technologies.29  Professor Chen argues that in 
 
 22. The scholars that participated in the symposium were:  Jack M. Balkin, Alan K. Chen, 
Danielle Keats Citron, Raphael Cohen-Almagor, Caroline Mala Corbin, Matthew Fisher, 
Abner Greene, David S. Han, Heidi Kitrosser, Andrew Koppelman, Joseph Landau, Larissa 
Lidsky, Helen Norton, Martin H. Redish, Joel Reidenberg, Thane Rosenbaum, and Alexander 
Tsesis. 
 23. 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam). 
 24. Alan K. Chen, Free Speech and the Confluence of National Security and Internet 
Exceptionalism, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 379, 397–99 (2017). 
 25. Id. at 380. 
 26. Id. at 381–85. 
 27. Id. at 385–97. 
 28. Id. at 397. 
 29. Id. 
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its current form, Brandenburg seems appropriately calibrated to provide 
broad protection for pure advocacy while permitting the government to 
regulate speech that presents a truly imminent danger.30 
Professor Danielle Citron and Brookings Institution Fellow Benjamin 
Wittes argue that courts have interpreted § 230 of the Communications 
Decency Act too broadly.31  As a result, courts have granted immunity to a 
variety of internet platforms even when those platforms intend to disseminate 
abuse and provide electronic forums for illegal conduct.32  This status quo 
empowers abusers to use forums with equanimity to defame, degrade, and 
otherwise harm victims, while the latter are left without recourse.33  Citron 
and Wittes propose either modification to the current judicial understanding 
of § 230 or legislative revision.34  Such revision would have to maintain 
robust speech freedoms on social media but also subject those platforms to 
liability when their existence is predicated on illegality35 ranging from 
defamatory claims about the sexuality of specific individuals to inflammatory 
terrorist assertions aimed at recruits; solicitation from site visitors for similar 
postings; and deliberate dissemination of such noxious content.36  Their 
suggested interpretation would maintain immunity for Good Samaritans 
while denying it to active “Bad Samaritans.”37 
Professor Raphael Cohen-Almagor points out that free speech without 
limitations might amount to lawlessness.38  Freedom of expression is one of 
the most basic and important values of liberal democracies, but it needs to be 
weighed against an equal value—social responsibility.39  A golden mean 
must be identified that will provide support for both freedom of expression 
and social responsibility.40  Internet companies not only provide access to the 
internet, they also facilitate and enable speech on the internet.41  Therefore, 
these intermediaries have moral and social responsibilities of effective 
gatekeeping that help prevent violent words from becoming violent actions.42  
Internet companies, as gatekeepers, should be proactive in fighting against 
violent speech.43  Cohen-Almagor argues that companies should act 
independently and proactively in preventing terrorist speech just as they do 
against corporate ultra vires acts.44 
 
 30. Id. 
 31. Danielle Keats Citron & Benjamin Wittes, The Internet Will Not Break:  Denying Bad 
Samaritans Section 230 Immunity, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 401, 408 (2017). 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 409–10. 
 34. Id. at 415. 
 35. Id. at 417–18. 
 36. Id. at 418. 
 37. Id. at 423–24. 
 38. Raphael Cohen-Almagor, The Role of Internet Intermediaries in Tackling Terrorism 
Online, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 425, 433 (2017). 
 39. Id. at 434–35, 452 
 40. Id. at 434–35. 
 41. Id. at 425. 
 42. Id. at 426. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 436–38. 
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However, internet companies regularly fail to monitor their 
communication networks.  Reasons they assert for this failure include a 
robust protection of free speech, the need for fast-paced innovation, the 
ambiguity of the meaning of hate speech, a commitment to avoid censorship, 
and the sheer volume of digital information streamed on social networks.45  
A considerable part of this reasoning is fueled by partisan economic interests 
aimed to increase profits and minimize expenses.46  Cohen-Almagor 
concludes that internet intermediaries must understand that with great power 
comes great responsibility.47  Online terrorism is a grave concern; thus, due 
care is imperative.48 
Context is important in determining whether certain speech incites 
violence.49  Therefore, internet intermediaries can, and should, develop 
adequate algorithms to determine the context of any given message and 
deduce whether the speech at hand is dangerous and terroristic.50  In 
achieving this goal, cooperation with governments and security agencies is 
preferred to coercion.51  It is better for internet intermediaries to be proactive 
than to be coerced into action by legislatures.52  Cohen-Almagor believes that 
responsibility accompanied by enhanced technology is within reach to enable 
the protection of society from the ills of terrorism.53 
Professor Caroline Mala Corbin elaborates on, considers, and examines the 
effects of internet posts that depict terrorists in the United States as Muslim 
while simultaneously refusing to depict white people as terrorists.54  These 
false stereotypes are partly attributable to the influence of news media, which 
often carry sensational reports of Muslim terrorism despite the fact that more 
terrorist attacks in the United States are perpetrated by white extremists.55  
Such white extremists, however, are rarely called terrorists despite being 
ideologically driven by a message of intimidation.56 
Corbin adopts critical race theory methodology to inform her awareness of 
subtle racism.57  Often, unconscious cognitive processes create racial and 
ethnic categories, such as the stereotype of the Muslim terrorist.58  
Meanwhile, she asserts, caucasians enjoy white privilege, which manifests in 
the public perception of white terrorists as lone wolves, rather than examples 
 
 45. Id. at 430–32, 434–35. 
 46. Id. at 435–36. 
 47. Id. at 452. 
 48. Id. at 426–27. 
 49. Id. at 444–45. 
 50. Id. at 433 & n.63. 
 51. See id. at 452. 
 52. See id. at 452–53. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Caroline Mala Corbin, Essay:  Terrorists Are Always Muslim but Never White:  At the 
Intersection of Critical Race Theory and Propaganda, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 455, 456–57 
(2017). 
 55. Id. at 461–62. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 462–63. 
 58. Id. at 464. 
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of endemic ethnic hatred.59  White people, as a whole, thereby avoid being 
generalized as terrorists.60 
Corbin then examines the intersection of critical race studies and 
propaganda.61  In particular, she looks at how President Donald Trump’s 
administration invokes these overgeneralized narratives to disseminate 
propaganda that relies on cognitive social narratives that do not carefully 
evaluate terrorism.62  This propaganda contains aspects of flawed racial 
beliefs63 and advances an anti-Muslim narrative while avoiding mention of 
white terrorism.64 
Professor David Han focuses on the subset of speech of terrorist 
advocacy—that is, abstract advocacy of unlawful terrorist activity.65  That 
form of communication does not fall under the traditional category of low-
value speech as defined by earlier U.S. Supreme Court cases.66  But 
exceptional circumstances may arise justifying regulation of such speech, and 
Professor Han examines how the First Amendment should account for such 
circumstances.67  He argues that courts should not immediately resort to 
broad doctrinal revision but rather should initially account for changed 
circumstances by applying strict scrutiny as is required under the current 
doctrinal framework.68  Adhering to a rigorous but meaningful strict scrutiny 
standard would give courts some flexibility to react in response to changed 
circumstances while acting as a valuable intermediate step to evaluate 
whether broader doctrinal reformulation is necessary.69  Stated somewhat 
differently, it gives courts a chance to carefully consider whether the present 
circumstances are truly indicative of a fundamentally changed reality or 
merely an outlier.70 
Professor Heidi Kitrosser’s article focuses on the federal statute 
prohibiting individuals from providing material support to designated 
terrorist organizations.71  She discusses lower-court opinions interpreting 
various provisions of the federal material support of terrorism statute.72  As 
she demonstrates, many such cases have involved expressive censorship.73  
Kitrosser recognizes that in extreme circumstances the statute serves a 
worthwhile goal, but there is reason to be concerned about ambiguities in the 
 
 59. Id. at 463. 
 60. Id. at 466. 
 61. Id. at 472–80. 
 62. Id. at 475. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 484–85. 
 65. David S. Han, Terrorist Advocacy and Exceptional Circumstances, 86 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 487, 487 (2017). 
 66. Id. at 491. 
 67. Id. at 493–97. 
 68. Id. at 498. 
 69. Id. at 501. 
 70. Id. at 507. 
 71. Heidi Kitrosser, Free Speech and National Security Bootstraps, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 
509, 511 (2017). 
 72. Id. at 512–17. 
 73. Id. 
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law, such as how groups are designated on the State Department’s official 
lists of foreign terrorist organizations and specially designated global 
terrorists.74  The principal case upholding the material-support statute, 
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project,75 has created judicial superdeference 
to regulations against speech perceived to help terrorist organizations.76  
Professor Kitrosser argues that the lack of adequate judicial oversight has 
allowed the government to use coercion to suppress constitutionally 
protected free expression.77 
Professor Andrew Koppelman argues that none of the proposed 
restrictions of terrorist incitement, beyond what is already unprotected, are 
workable.78  The law cannot reach internet speech that originates overseas 
and restrictions on reading such material do not provide readers with 
adequate notice of what is banned.79  There is also value in permitting readers 
to expose themselves to evil and destructive views.80  People may make bad 
choices when they are treated as adults, but free people have to be permitted 
to contemplate such choices.81 
Professor Helen Norton addresses various constitutional concerns raised 
by the government’s role as speaker in the War on Terror.82  She explains 
that government speech is especially powerful because of its ubiquity, 
variety, and reach.83  At times, the government’s wartime speech has a 
positive influence by calling for unity and healing or by informing the public 
about important issues.84  At other times, however, the government uses its 
wartime voice to deceive the public about its decisions or to denigrate and 
instill hatred against perceived outsiders.85  She closes by discussing a range 
of potential legal and policy responses to the government’s wartime 
fearmongering and lies.86 
Professor Martin Redish and Matthew Fisher draw on the strategy and 
conduct of terrorist organizations to evaluate whether their speech can be 
restricted.87  Such organizations engage in cybercommunications to terrorize 
and energize lone wolves to act on violent ideologies.88  Modern free speech 
doctrine has two strands relevant to the question of whether these terrorist 
 
 74. Id. at 520. 
 75. 561 U.S. 1 (2010). 
 76. Kitrosser, supra note 71, at 527. 
 77. Id. at 528. 
 78. Andrew Koppelman, Entertaining Satan:  Why We Tolerate Terrorist Incitement, 86 
FORDHAM L. REV. 535, 535 (2017). 
 79. Id. at 538. 
 80. Id. at 540. 
 81. Id. at 541–42. 
 82. Helen Norton, Government Speech and the War on Terror, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 543, 
543 (2017). 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 546. 
 85. Id. at 547–57. 
 86. Id. at 558–62. 
 87. Martin H. Redish & Matthew Fisher, Terrorizing Advocacy and the First Amendment:  
Free Expression and the Fallacy of Mutual Exclusivity, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 565, 566–67 
(2017). 
 88. Id. at 567–68. 
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communications in cyberspace can be regulated.  They are the “true threats” 
and “incitement” doctrines.89  On the one hand, true threats are inherently 
coercive acts and therefore beyond the scope of the First Amendment.90  
Unlawful advocacy, on the other hand, is protected under the Brandenburg 
incitement doctrine.91  Both doctrines are pertinent to terrorizing advocacy, 
which seeks to cause immediate terror in listeners analogous to a true threat.92   
Yet terrorists do not simply speak in symbolic terms but aim to illicit action 
and trauma.93  Terror speech seeks to terrorize listeners and to induce 
criminal conduct.94  To deal with these threats, a model is needed to deal with 
hybrid speech.95  That model has three qualifications:  First, the speaker must 
call for criminal, physical violence.96  Second, the intended victim must be 
aware of the threat.97  Lastly, the threat must be real, not abstract.98  If these 
are met, government would be allowed to suppress the nonspeech, coercive 
terror.99 
Professor Thane Rosenbaum argues that terrorism transmitted on the 
internet should give us pause to reflect on how we conceptualize free 
speech.100  The United States is an outlier in this area of law.101  Many 
Americans assume that expressive interactions will always lead to meaning 
and truth despite evidence of real harms that speech can pose.102  Rosenbaum 
believes that our narcissism when it comes to extolling this fundamental 
liberty hampers our ability to make moral choices.103  Many people refuse to 
take moral positions because of free speech zealotry.104  These First 
Amendment absolutists, as he sees it, suffer from a form of intellectual 
myopia:  they put ideology ahead of considerations of public safety and even 
common sense.105  Fascism can clearly emerge from internet anonymity and 
animus.106  This is not a marketplace of ideas.107  Tranquility and security 
stand on an equal plane with speech.108  Indeed, a people imprisoned by terror 
have lost all claim and capacity to exercise their freedoms.109  In this manner, 
 
 89. Id. at 570. 
 90. Id. at 573–74. 
 91. Id. at 571–72. 
 92. Id. at 576–77. 
 93. Id. at 577. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 580. 
 96. Id. at 584–86. 
 97. Id. at 582–84. 
 98. Id. at 586–89. 
 99. Id. at 590. 
 100. Thane Rosenbaum, Essay:  The Internet as Marketplace of Madness—and a 
Terrorist’s Best Friend, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 591, 591–92 (2017). 
 101. Id. at 603. 
 102. Id. at 591–92. 
 103. See id. at 601–02. 
 104. Id. at 591–93. 
 105. Id. 
 106. See id. at 596–97. 
 107. Id. at 595–96, 600. 
 108. See id. at 598–99. 
 109. See id. at 602–03. 
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harms caused by terrorist speech delivered on the internet should be regarded 
with the same exclusion from First Amendment protection as any other clear, 
present, and imminent danger.110 
Professor Alexander Tsesis’s article concentrates on terrorists’ widespread 
adoption of social media platforms.111  As terrorist networks increasingly 
embrace new media, internet information companies often remain reluctant 
or ambivalent about removing even explicit and graphic calls for 
ideologically motivated carnage, disruption, destruction, and terrorist 
indoctrination.112  While those companies are not purveyors of threats or 
incitement,113 their responsibility nevertheless arises when they cooperate 
with terrorist organizations by providing a platform for their indoctrination, 
threats, and instructive contents.114  With an increasingly proliferating 
number of terrorist webpages, self-policing has proven ineffective.115  
However, in certain circumstances, internet services can run afoul of the 
material-support statute.116  Using this statute, concerted government-led 
criminal prosecutions and injunctions are needed to maintain national and 
international standards against the material support of designated terrorist 
organizations.117  However, just as increased government enforcement is 
critical for stamping out terrorist incitement, so too must the government 
guarantee rigorous free speech protections through government transparency, 
procedural safeguards, clearly defined designations, and judicial review.118 
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